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In a report presented at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in 
March 2002, the World Bank claims that the effectiveness of its financial aid has 
improved substantially by targeting aid at poor developing countries pursuing 
sound economic policies. This paper argues that the World Bank's success story 
rests on a weak empirical foundation. The evidence does not support the view 
that poverty concerns and policy assessments dominated the distribution of 
World Bank financing in the 1990s. We conclude that the task of improving the 
allocation of aid is far from being accomplished. Finally, we discuss some 
implications of our findings for the future role of the World Bank in 
development financing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A recent World Bank report on the role and effectiveness of foreign aid 
(World Bank 2002), presented at the UN Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, seems to have turned 
the tide in favor of more aid. Prior to this conference, the US 
administration, notably treasury secretary Paul O'Neill, insisted on aid 
having helped little to spur economic growth and alleviate poverty in 
recipient countries; calls for more aid were sharply rejected (The Economist 
2002a). The World Bank confronted the sceptics with empirical evidence 
showing that, in contrast to generalized verdicts, foreign aid has worked 
when allocated to poor countries pursuing sound economic policies.0F1 
Yet, it came to almost everybody's surprise that President Bush, in his 
address delivered at the Monterrey meeting, outlined a new approach of the 
United States to foreign aid which is largely in line with the World Bank's 
reasoning. President Bush announced to increase US aid by US$ 5 billion 
per annum (i.e., by 50 percent) until 2006, "exclusively for countries with 
good governance, investing in health and education and encouraging 
                                           
1   The report draws on earlier research, e.g. by World Bank (1998), Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) as well as Collier and Dollar (2001).  
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economic freedom" (The Economist 2002b). Shortly before, EU ministers 
had agreed to raise European aid from an average of 0.33 percent of GNP 
to 0.39 percent of GNP. The World Bank report appears to have prompted 
politicians to join in "a feast of giving" (The Economist 2002b). 
Unexpected generosity of aid donors was probably not only because the 
World Bank could draw on previous findings suggesting that aid works 
under favorable circumstances. The report went an important step further 
and claimed that recent aid has actually been spent in accordance with 
these findings. It is pointed out that the donor community as a whole has 
improved the targeting of aid; in contrast to the early 1990s, countries with 
better policies received substantially more aid per capita (US$ 29) in the 
late 1990s than countries with poor policies (US$ 16). Moreover, the report 
portrays the World Bank as a frontrunner in allocating its own aid to where 
effectiveness is reasonably expected to be high:1F2 "Even in 1990, much 
more IDA funding went to the good-policy countries ($ 4.7 per capita) than 
to the poor-policy countries ($ 2 per capita). By the late 1990s, targeting 
had improved still further: good-policy countries now receive $  6.5 per 
                                           
2   Note that overall financing by the World Bank consists of highly concessional 
funding by the International Development Association (IDA) and of lending at 




   
capita, compared with $ 2.3 per capita in poor-policy countries ... IBRD 
(nonconcessional) lending also goes primarily to countries with good 
policies and institutions" (World Bank 2002: xix). 
The contention that "aid allocation has improved dramatically in recent 
years" (World Bank 2002: 70) may have convinced previous sceptics that it 
was high time to offer more aid. However, the few observers who remained 
reluctant to take official numbers for granted2F3 may have a point. As shown 
below, the World Bank's success story rests on weak empirical foundations. 
The widely quoted figures on per-capita aid are highly sensitive to the 
treatment of outliers (Section II). The distribution of World Bank financing 
in the 1990s was largely driven by the institution's contribution to financial 
rescue packages for some emerging markets, rather than having been 
dominated by poverty concerns and policy assessments (Section III). 
Regression results suggest that little has changed so far in targeting aid at 
poor countries with good policies (Section IV). All this leads to the 
conclusion that the task of improving the allocation of aid is far from being 
accomplished, which has important implications for the future role of the 
World Bank in development financing (Section V). 
                                           
3  For example, Republican Congressman Jim Saxton announced that the World Bank's 
allegations will be checked with scrutiny in US Congress (Elliesen 2002: 125).  
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II.  MISLEADING AVERAGES OF PER-CAPITA AID 
The World Bank is rather imprecise in spelling out the statistical details of 
its calculations. The sample of countries is not given, and it is not specified 
whether the report refers to (gross) disbursements or net flows 
(disbursements minus principal repayments) of concessional IDA financing 
and market-related IBRD lending. In the following, we principally use net 
flows. In addition, we present calculations based on gross disbursements 
where net flows may provide a distorted picture. This applies to IDA in 
particular. Various developing countries which are relatively advanced and, 
hence, no longer eligible to IDA financing, report negative net IDA flows 
due to principal repayments of earlier IDA loans. These countries are 
excluded from the sample when assessing the distribution of gross 
disbursements. We follow the World Bank in taking its Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a yardstick of good versus poor 
policy.3F4 The income status of recipient countries and the incidence of 
absolute poverty is measured by GNP per capita (purchasing power parity) 
                                           
4   The range is from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). We use the classification as 
published in Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3). The fact that only one CPIA 
observation was available to us limits the subsequent evaluation in some respects 
(see below).  
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and the share of the population living on less than US$  2 per day, 
respectively.4F5 
The World Bank considers aid flows to recipient countries in per-capita 
terms, in order to show that its financing patterns have increasingly been 
shaped by poverty concerns and policy assessments. However, it proved 
impossible to figure out exactly how the World Bank arrived at the result 
that "good-policy countries now receive $ 6.5 per capita, compared with 
$ 2.3 per capita in poor-policy countries" (World Bank 2002: xix) from 
IDA. Apart from not providing information on the sample and flow items 
on which calculations are based, it is unclear what exactly is meant by "the 
late 1990s". We interpret this as 1997–1999, and relate the annual average 
of IDA disbursements in this period to the recipient countries' population in 
1998. In this way, we arrive at a sample of 58 IDA clients, for which per-
capita flows in 1997–1999 and the CPIA-classification are listed in the 
Appendix Table. 
                                           
5   GNP per capita is from World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-RoM; 
poverty incidence is taken from Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3).  
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Average per-capita flows for countries belonging to different policy 
categories are presented in Figure 1.5F6 The averages given there are higher 
for both, poor-policy countries and good-policy countries than the above 
mentioned averages in World Bank (2002: xix).6F7 However, this difference 
has no major bearing for the World Bank's essential message that IDA 
financing favors good-policy countries by a wide margin over poor-policy 
countries. 
The reason why the World Bank's contention of an appropriate targeting of 
IDA financing is rather shaky is that group averages as reported above are 
seriously misleading, independent of whether averages are based on gross 
disbursements or net flows. Some outliers with extremely high per-capita 
aid from IDA in the late 1990s (see Appendix Table) distort the picture, a 
problem ignored by the World Bank. Cape Verde and Honduras clearly 
 
                                           
6  Countries with very poor and poor policies (CPIA 1 and 2) are grouped together, as 
only three countries belong to CPIA 1. For the same reason, we combine CPIA 
categories 4 and 5 (see Appendix Table). 
7 This difference may be because the World Bank considers net flows, instead of gross 
disbursements. However, we could still not reproduce the World Bank figures when 
we calculated averages on the basis of net flows. This suggests that our sample 
differs from the World Bank's. For example, the World Bank may have included 
countries with low or zero flows from IDA, which we had to exclude due to lacking 
observations on CPIA.  
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Figure 1 — Higher Per-capita Aid from IDA to Good-policy Countries? 
(average gross IDA disbursementsa per capita according to 

















 1/2 3  4/5
US$        
CPIA
 
aBy considering gross disbursements, we exclude countries no longer eligible to IDA 
financing. – bPeriod averages. – cExcluding Cape Verde and Honduras. 
Source: Appendix Table.  
 
8 
   
stand out with per-capita flows of US$ 44 and US$ 23, respectively.7F8 If 
only these two countries are excluded from the sample, the group average 
for countries in CPIA 4 and 5 declines from US$ 9.2 to US$ 6.3. Countries 
with good policies (CPIA 4), except Cape Verde and Honduras, received 
only US$ 5.2 on average in 1997–1999. This was significantly less than the 
average for countries with moderate policies (CPIA 3), and just 27 percent 
more than the average for countries with poor and very poor policies (CPIA 
1 and 2). 
Group averages are still more sensitive to the treatment of outliers, if 
calculations are based on annual observations (as done by the World Bank 
in some instances at least). The distribution of IDA disbursements in the 
latest available year, 1999, is in line with the World Bank's success story 
only if outliers are ignored: All recipients in CPIA category 4 (good policy) 
got 2.3 times as much per-capita aid as recipients in CPIA category 2 (poor 
                                           
8 Due to Cape Verde's small population (0.4 million in 1998), per-capita aid was 
extremely high even though absolute annual flows hardly exceeded US$ 20 million 
at the end of the 1990s. Aid to this country was mainly in three areas: energy and 
water sector reform, privatization and regulatory capacity building, and education 
and training (see the project documents on Cape Verde available from 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/regions.htm). Honduras received exceptionally 
high aid from IDA in 1999 (US$ 273 million). This was primarily a reaction to the 
hurricane Mitch in October 1998, which hit Honduras particularly hard (see World 
Bank Report No. PID 7193 under the above internet address). It can safely be 
assumed that emergency relief to Honduras would also have been granted if the 
country's policies had not been rated good.  
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policy). Once Cape Verde and Honduras are excluded, the remaining (13) 
countries with good policies, on average, received just US$ 3.8 per capita 
in 1999. This was about half the per-capita aid granted to countries with 
moderate policies (US$ 7.3), and even less than the average for countries 
with poor policies (US$ 4.3). 
Furthermore, the World Bank's contention that the targeting of IDA 
financing has improved most recently rests on a weak foundation. True, the 
ratio of per-capita aid received by countries with good policies (CPIA 4) to 
per-capita aid received by countries with poor policies (CPIA 2) was 
significantly higher in 1999 than before, if group averages are not corrected 
for countries with exceptionally high disbursements (Figure 2). Once this 
correction is made, the ratio drops dramatically; and it is no longer true that 
the ratio increased in the course of the 1990s. 
In summary, the World Bank's success story is extremely sensitive to the 
treatment of a few outliers in terms of per-capita aid from IDA. Success or 
failure in targeting aid should not be judged on arbitrary averages of per-
capita aid. In order to avoid such distortions, we turn to the distribution of 
World Bank financing in absolute terms in the subsequent section. 
Moreover, we extend the discussion by analyzing World Bank lending at  
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market related terms in addition to IDA disbursements. 
Figure  2  —  Good-policy Countries Favored at the End of the 1990s? 
(ratio of gross IDA disbursements per capita, CPIA 4-


















aPeriod averages. — b1990-1999: Cape Verde and Guyana; 1999: Cape Verde and 
Honduras. All three countries belong to CPIA 4 and received exceptionally high IDA 
disbursements. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, CD-ROM; Collier and Dollar 
(2001:Table3). 
 
III.  WHAT EXPLAINS THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD BANK 
FINANCING? 
In the following, we evaluate the allocation of absolute aid flows in the 
1990s. The proposition that World Bank aid has been focused increasingly  
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on poor recipient countries pursuing development friendly policies is 
checked by comparing annual averages of aid in the first half and in the 
second half of the 1990s. This exercise reveals that recent changes in the 
distribution of World Bank financing were primarily due to the institution's 
involvement in providing emergency loans to some major emerging 
markets in financial distress, rather than poverty concerns and policy 
assessments. 
Figure 3 shows that low-income countries received a substantially lower 
share of total (net) World Bank flows (IDA plus IBRD) in the second 
subperiod than in the first. The corresponding increase in the share of 
middle-income countries is mainly because of heavy IBRD lending to some 
crisis countries.8F9 It is only when net flows to seven emerging markets 
suffering financial distress in the 1990s9F10 are excluded from the sample 
that the bulk of World Bank financing (93 percent) was allocated to low-
income countries in 1995–1999. 
 
                                           
9   For example, IBRD lending (net flows) to Russia in 1995–1999 summed up to 
US$ 6.2 billion. Korea received US$ 6.5 billion in 1997–1999. 
10 In addition to Korea and Russia, the list includes Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Mexico and Thailand; Malaysia is not considered here as no significant crisis 
financing was provided.  
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Figure 3 —  Better Focus on Poor Countries?  
(distribution of total net World Bank flows according to per-
capita incomea) 
















low-income lower middle-income upper middle-income
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99
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low-income lower middle-income upper middle-income
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99
percent
 
aPeriod averages of net flows; classification of low-income, lower middle-income and 
upper middle-income countries according to World Development Indicators. 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, CD-ROM; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, CD-ROM.  
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It is debatable whether the World Bank should play a major role in crisis 
financing. This issue is taken up in Section V below, as it would be fairly 
heroic to assume that recent financial crises were exceptional and similar 
crises are unlikely to occur in the future. Here, it is important to note that 
World Bank financing in the second half of the 1990s hardly reveals a 
stronger focus on recipient countries with high incidence of absolute 
poverty, even when the above mentioned crisis countries are left out of 
account. According to Figure 4, countries with pervasive poverty received 
about half of total (net) World Bank flows in both subperiods. It is no 
longer surprising that their share declined significantly, if the overall 
sample is considered. 
Given the aforementioned constraints on data availability concerning 
CPIA, we cannot compare the second half of the 1990s with the first half 
when it comes to the distribution of World Bank financing among 
recipients in different policy categories. Nevertheless, the evidence  
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Figure 4 —  Better Focus on Absolute Poverty?  
(distribution of total net World Bank flows according to 
poverty incidencea) 
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aPeriod averages of net flows; poverty incidence, i.e. percentage of population living on 
less than US$ 2 per day, as in Collier and Dollar (2001); low: up to 33 percent; medium: 
34-66 percent; high: more than 66 percent. 




   
presented in Figure 5 indicates that there remains considerable room for 
improving the allocation of aid. Almost 30 percent of total (net) World 
Bank flows in 1995–1999 went to countries whose policies were rated poor 
or very poor. 
Substantial financing of Russia was partly responsible for this high share. If 
all seven emerging markets with financial crises are excluded, the 
combined share of countries in policy categories 1 and 2 declines to 25 
percent of World Bank flows to all remaining sample countries. At the 
same time, however, the combined share of countries in policy categories 4 
and 5 (good and very good) declines from 57 percent to 52 percent; World 
Bank financing to countries with very good policies turns even negative. 
Hence, the allocation of World Bank financing still leaves much to be 




   
Figure 5 —  Focus on Countries with Good Policiesa? 









b) distribution of gross IDA disbursementsc, 1995-1999b (percent) 







aPolicy categories as in Collier and Dollar (2001). — bPeriod averages. — cWe use 
gross disbursements, rather than net flows, for IDA, in order to exclude countries no 
longer eligible to IDA financing. 




   
The combined share of countries with good and very good policies is very much 
the same (about 57 percent) for total (net) World Bank flows on the one hand, 
and IDA disbursements on the other hand (Figure 5).10F11 Nevertheless, IDA 
disbursements appear to be better targeted than World Bank lending at market 
related terms, as the share of countries with poor and very poor policies in 
overall IDA disbursements is considerably lower. It is thus mainly with regard 
to World Bank lending that the distribution of aid conveys two related insights: 
First, the institution's participation in funding rescue packages for some 
emerging markets had an important impact on recent World Bank financing. 
Second, taking the World Bank's rhetoric on poverty and policy orientation 
seriously, the effectiveness of its financing could still be improved considerably 
by reallocating available funds. 
IV. THE TARGETING OF AID: REGRESSION RESULTS 
In order to better assess the targeting of World Bank aid, it seems appropriate to 
run some simple regressions in which both, the income status and the policy 
rating of recipient countries enter as independent variables. We use four 
                                           
11 For reasons stated above, Figure 5 relates to gross IDA disbursements. Yet, the distribution 
of net IDA flows is very similar to gross disbursements. Countries with poor and very poor 
policies received 15.4 percent of net flows, countries with moderate policies got 28.8 
percent, and countries with good and very good policies received 55.8 percent.  
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different dependent variables: total net World Bank flows in per-capita terms 
and, alternatively, as percentage of the recipient countries’ GNP, as well as 
gross IDA disbursements in per-capita terms and, alternatively, as percentage of 
the recipient countries’ GNP. 
The regression approach may be flawed in two respects. First, the two right-
hand variables, the income status and the policy rating of recipient countries, 
may not be independent of each other. Collinearity might be expected if 
minimum standards of economic development were required to pursue sound 
economic policies. More plausibly perhaps, collinearity may result from poor 
policies going along with poor economic performance and, thus, lower per-
capita income. As a matter of fact, the correlation between per-capita income 
and policy ratings turns out to be significantly positive. However, the correlation 
coefficient of 0.55 across all 106 sample countries is clearly below the 
"commonly used rule of thumb [which] is that a correlation coefficient between 
two explanatory variables greater than 0.8 or 0.9 indicates a strong linear 
association and a potentially harmful collinear relationship" (Hill et al. 1997: 
173). A still lower correlation coefficient of 0.49 is achieved, if per-capita  
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income and policy ratings of the 57 recipients of IDA disbursements are 
considered.11F12 
Second, for evaluating whether targeting improved in the course of the 1990s, 
the optimal approach would have been to run the regressions for the first half of 
the 1990s on the one hand, and for the second half of this decade on the other 
hand. We could not take this preferable route as the World Bank’s policy rating 
(CPIA) in the first half of the 1990s was not known to us. This is why Table 1 
compares regression results achieved for average flows throughout the 1990s 
with results achieved for average flows in the late 1990s (1997–1999). For both 
periods, we had to apply the CPIA rating as provided by Collier and Dollar 
(2001: Table 3).12F13 Consequently, we tend to underestimate the effect of 
 
                                           
12 It may also be noted that the R²s of various regressions reported below are fairly low. By 
contrast, serious collinearity is typically indicated by the combination of high R²s and low 
t-values. Furthermore, skipping the income variable in the regression does not result in 
significantly positive coefficients of the policy variable. 
13 By contrast, per-capita income of recipient countries in 1995 entered regressions for 1990-
1999, while per-capita income in 1998 entered regressions for 1997–1999.  
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Table  1  —  World Bank Aid, Per-capita Income, and Economic Policy of 
Recipient Countries: Regression Resultsa 
Dependent variableb/ 
 time  periodc 
Constant Incomed Policye  2 ˆ R  
number of 
observations
total  World  Bank  financing       
- per capita, 1990-99  3.67*  -0.00038  0.47  0.004  105 
 (2.26)  (-1.55)  (0.87)     
- per capita, 1997-99  2.00  0.00008  0.68  -0.007  104 
  (0.77) (0.21) (0.75)     
- percent of GNP, 1990-99  1.59**  -0.00027** 0.08  0.30  103 
 (5.50)  (-6.13)  (0.79)     
- percent of GNP, 1997-99  1.18**  -0.00023** 0.14  0.24  104 
 (4.15)  (-5.43)  (1.46)     
         
IDA  financing         
- per capita, 1990-99  2.34  -0.00028  1.54*  0.07  56 
 (1.27)  (-0.96)  (2.42)     
- per capita, 1997-99  0.96  0.00018  1.51  0.07  54 
  (0.38) (0.46) (1.66)     
- percent of GNP, 1990-99  1.86**  -0.00032** 0.32  0.21  56 
 (3.70)  (-4.06)  (1.82)     
- percent of GNP, 1997-99  1.31**  -0.00027** 0.41*  0.19  54 
 (2.81)  (-3.84)  (2.48)     
       
at-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) significant at 1 (5) percent level (two-tailed). – bNet flows in 
the case of total World Bank financing; gross disbursements in the case of IDA; both variables 
related to either the recipient countries' population (per capita) or the recipient countries' GNP 
(percent of GNP). – cPeriod averages. – dPer-capita income (PPP) of recipient countries in 1995 
(for flows in 1990-1999) or 1998 (for flows in 1997-1999). – eAccording to the World Bank's 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment as given in Collier and Dollar (2001); range from 1 
(very poor) to 5 (very good). 
 
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, CD-RoM; World Bank, World 




   
CPIA on average flows in 1990-1999, if the rating changed during the 1990s. 
Such a bias would work in favor of the World Bank’s claim that the policy 
orientation of its financial aid has become stronger since recently. 
Nevertheless, the regression results in Table 1 suggest that little has changed in 
the late 1990s as concerns the allocation of aid. Results turned out to be   
particularly weak for total World Bank financing: 
–  Measured in per-capita terms, all coefficients remain insignificant if the 
regression is run across all sample countries. In additional regressions, not 
reported in Table 1, we excluded the seven emerging markets with financial 
crises. For the restricted sample, the coefficients of the income variable 
become significantly negative, but the coefficients of the policy variable are 
still insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
–  As percentage of the recipient countries’ GNP, total World Bank financing 
favored lower-income countries. But this relation did not become stronger in 
the late 1990s. The policy variable CPIA is insignificant for both periods 
considered.13F14 
                                           
14 If World Bank financing is related to the recipient countries' GNP, regression results for 
the restricted sample (excluding the seven crisis countries) hardly deviate from regression 
results for the overall sample.  
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As concerns IDA disbursements, the coefficients of the income variable are 
similar to results for total World Bank financing. By contrast, IDA 
disbursements have at least some relation to the policy rating of recipient 
countries. Two out of four coefficients of CPIA are significant at the 5 percent 
level. The proposition of a stronger policy orientation of IDA aid in the late 
1990s cannot be rejected, if disbursements are measured as percentage of the 
recipient countries’ GNP.14F15 However, results achieved for IDA disbursements 
in per-capita terms are in conflict with this proposition. Taken together, the 
regression results underscore our earlier reasoning that the task of improving the 
allocation of financial aid is far from being accomplished. 
V.  THE FUTURE ROLE OF WORLD BANK FINANCING 
In the report presented at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey in March 2002, the World Bank contends that the effectiveness of its 
financial aid has improved dramatically by a redistribution of aid in favor of 
poor developing countries pursuing sound economic policies. A critical 
evaluation reveals that the World Bank's success story rests on a rather weak 
                                           
15 The coefficient of CPIA is smaller, and significant only at the 10 percent level, when the 
regression is run for 1990-1999.  
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empirical foundation. In particular, our findings do not support the World Bank's 
claim that its financial aid has been well targeted at countries with good policies. 
With regard to World Bank lending, poverty concerns and policy assessments 
seem to have taken second place to the institution's role in co-financing rescue 
packages for emerging markets. This raises a first question concerning the future 
of World Bank financing, namely whether this institution should continue to 
play this role.15F16 The major argument suggesting an affirmative answer is that 
financial crises have frequently aggravated poverty. The World Bank (2000b: 6) 
notes with respect to Asia that "the deep recession had pushed millions of East 
Asians below the poverty line." However, the findings of Dollar and Kraay 
(2000) are in contrast with the widely held belief that incomes of the poor fall 
more than proportionally during economic crises. Furthermore, it can be 
questioned on several grounds that emergency financing has been effective in 
alleviating poverty: 
•  Among the Asian crisis countries, for example, the incidence of absolute 
poverty in Indonesia was twice as high as in Korea (59 versus 30 percent of 
                                           
16 Given the focus of our analysis in the preceding sections, the subsequent discussion is 
restricted to financial World Bank support granted to individual developing countries. 
Issues related to technical assistance and the financing of international public goods, in 
which the World Bank may play a relevant role in the future (Sachs 1999; Nunnenkamp 
2002), are not addressed.  
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the population living on less than US$ 2 per day). Nevertheless, Korea 
received World Bank funds of US$ 6.5 billion in 1997–1999, compared with 
US$ 0.9 billion in the case of Indonesia. The Philippines, where the 
incidence of absolute poverty was still higher than in Indonesia, reported 
negative net flows from the World Bank in 1997–1999, even though policies 
of the Philippines were rated good. 
•  Crisis-induced increases in absolute poverty in emerging markets 
notwithstanding, the available data suggest that poverty problems were much 
more serious in developing countries with lower per-capita income. The 
average share of the population living on less than US$ 2 per day amounted 
to 72 percent in all sample countries with a per-capita income of less than 
US$ 760 in 1998. The corresponding average for the seven emerging 
markets with financial crises was 35 percent. Hence, the World Bank's 
contribution to emergency financing involves a trade-off and may come at 
the cost of effective poverty alleviation. Assuming that World Bank 
resources are limited, emergency financing tends to divert resources away 
from where they are most needed. 
•  Another concern is that emergency financing runs the risk of bailing out the 
private creditors of crisis countries, rather than helping these countries to 
mitigate income losses. This remains a valid concern unless reforms of the  
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international financial architecture prevent private creditors from rushing to 
the exits in crisis situations, which renders it almost impossible to achieve a 
fair burden sharing.16F17 
The issue of bail-outs concerns emergency financing, independently of whether 
supplied by the IMF or the World Bank. Yet, this problem strengthens the case 
for a clear division of labor between these two institutions. It is the IMF which 
has the mandate to provide bridging finance in order to overcome temporary 
payments problems of member countries. At the same time, the IMF is better 
equipped than the World Bank to limit moral hazard of  borrowers and their 
private creditors. Borrowers can be discouraged from drawing extensively and 
permanently on IMF financing by relatively high interest rates and relatively 
short maturities of IMF loans. Bail-out expectations of private creditors may be 
reduced by pending reforms of the international financial architecture, a task in 
which the IMF is closely involved.17F18 Hence, we support the conclusion of the 
Meltzer Commission (2000:8) that development agencies such as the World 
Bank "should be precluded from financial crisis lending." 
                                           
17 On this issue, see Nunnenkamp (2001: 141) and the literature given there. 
18 See, for example, the proposal by the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF on a new 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring (Krueger 2001).  
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On the other hand, the request for a clear division of labor between the Bretton 
Woods institutions implies that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
should be transferred from the IMF to the World Bank, whose concern should 
be long-term development financing. This invites a second question related to 
the World Bank's future role, namely whether this institution should provide 
financial support exclusively to low-income countries, as recommended by the 
Meltzer Commission (2000). The arguments frequently advanced against this 
proposition are not convincing. It is of course true that absolute poverty is not 
restricted to low-income countries. However, as indicated already, the incidence 
of absolute poverty is typically much lower in middle-income countries. 
Moreover, except for periods of international financial turmoil, more advanced 
developing countries command over more domestic resources and have easier 
access to private foreign capital in order to fight poverty.  
This is not to ignore that abruptly ending World Bank lending to middle-income 
countries may add significantly to the burden of repaying outstanding loans in 
countries which are already net debt repayers to the World Bank. However, an 
unmanageable repayment schedule can be avoided by phasing out the provision 
of new loans gradually. It may also be noted that phasing out financial aid to 
relatively advanced developing countries would not preclude the World Bank 
from offering technical assistance to middle-income countries. For example,  
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governments of middle-income countries may draw on World Bank advice in 
setting up a social infrastructure which may help alleviate poverty. 
Once the World Bank focuses financial support more strongly on low-income 
countries, a third question comes to the fore, namely how to improve the 
effectiveness of aid granted to these recipients. While a detailed discussion of 
this issue goes beyond the scope of this article, important aspects shall be 
addressed shortly. The most important lesson from experience with aid seems to 
be widely accepted by now: The idea that aid buys reform (i.e., induces 
governments to adopt growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing policies) has 
utterly failed (Collier 1997: 56). Rather, "ownership" of reform programs by 
governments is critical for the effectiveness of aid. This implies that stricter 
conditions attached to financial aid by donors are unlikely to result in better 
policies and significant poverty alleviation. For aid to be effective, the initiative 
for policy reforms aiming at poverty alleviation has to come from the recipients 
themselves. 
The donor community, including the World Bank, would have to support such 
initiatives by directing aid to reform-minded countries. This is basically what 
characterizes the so-called common pool approach to development assistance 
(Kanbur et al. 1999). In a similar vein, the Meltzer Commission (2000: 7) 
recommends performance-based support of poverty related projects, e.g. in  
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health care, primary education and physical infrastructure: "In poor countries 
without capital market access, poverty alleviation grants to subsidize user fees 
should be paid directly to the supplier upon independently verified delivery of 
service." 
If aid flows were clearly linked to the recipients' "ownership" of poverty related 
reforms and projects, the current discussion on whether aid should be provided 
in the form of (subsidized) loans or outright grants would become considerably 
less relevant. In contrast to the United States administration, various European 
donors resist grant financing and favor loans, in order to impose discipline on 
the borrowing country and to replenish the World Bank's pool of loanable 
resources with repayments from previous borrowers. The disciplinary effect of 
repayment obligations stretching over decades appears to be fairly weak, 
however. A stronger commitment could be achieved if aid recipients were 
required to co-finance poverty alleviation programs supported by grants from 
the World Bank. Finally, refinancing of the World Bank may become less 
arduous once this institution can present convincing evidence to major 





   
Appendix  Table  — Gross IDA Disbursements to 58 Developing 
Countries, 1997–1999a (US$ per capita) 
  CPIA  US$ p.c.    CPIA  US$ p.c. 
Angola 1  2.85  Bangladesh  4  2.82 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1  0.00  Cape Verde  4  44.16 
Equatorial Guinea  1  1.31  China  4  0.47 
Burundi 2  2.58  Côte  d'Ivoire  4  8.82 
Central Afr. Rep.  2   0.71  Egypt  4  1.34 
Chad 2  5.47  Ethiopia  4  1.58 
Comores 2  5.21  Ghana  4  12.94 
Congo, Rep.  2  0.11  Guyana  4  13.31 
Guinea 2  9.61  Honduras  4  23.39 
Guinea-Bissau 2  7.20  India  4  0.85 
Haiti 2  4.04  Lesotho  4  5.85 
Indonesia 2    0.02  Mongolia 4  8.35 
Kenya 2  3.25  Philippines  4  0.11 
Lao PDR  2  5.86  Senegal  4  7.18 
Madagascar 2  6.62  Sri  Lanka  4  3.97 
Moldova 2  5.94  Kyrgyz  Rep.  5  10.90 
Nepal 2  2.40  Maldives  5  12.95 
Niger 2  4.12  St.  Lucia  5  8.11 
Nigeria 2  0.81  Uganda 5  7.35 
Rwanda 2  7.76  average (4+5)  –  9.18 
Sierra Leone  2  3.95      
Solomon Islands  2  10.01      
Tajikistan 2  5.22       
Vanuatu 2  2.73       
average (1+2)  –  4.07      
         
         
Azerbaijan 3  5.75       
Benin 3  4.93       
Burkina Faso  3  4.86       
Cameroon 3  6.15       
Malawi 3  10.29       
Mali 3  5.65       
Mauritania 3  10.21       
Mozambique 3  7.05       
Nicaragua 3  19.15       
Pakistan 3  1.63       
Tanzania 3  5.02       
Togo 3  6.24       
Vietnam 3  2.58       
Zambia 3  12.69       
Zimbabwe 3  3.78       
average 3  –  7.07      
a Annual average, divided by population in 1998. 
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, CD-RoM; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2000, DC-RoM; Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3).  
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